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Ethical Breach and the Schizophrenic Process: Theorizing the Judge and the Teacher
Heather GreenhalghSpencer, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign
Bryce Bartlett, Independent Scholar and Practicing Attorney at Law
As the title of this piece suggests, we theorize some of the similarities and differences between the judging and teaching
profession. At first glance, the differences seem more apparent than any similarities. As we've discussed this text with
colleagues and friends, overwhelmingly, the first question asked is: A judge and teacher, what do they have in common?
However, we believe that the judge and teacher are uniquely positioned as fraternal partners across the labor/cultural
landscape; we see more similarities than differences.
In choosing which professions to analyze, we have rejected seemingly natural classifications (such as doctor and lawyer or
teacher and nurse), as these overdetermined categories flow along various competing discourses of capitalism and sexism.
In fact, by choosing to compare the professions of judge and teacher, we are trying to reject the sexist pairings of, for
example, nurse and teacher (the helping professionsusually coded as female) and doctor, politician, judge (the powerful
professionsusually coded as male). Instead, we will focus on the functional goals, i.e., desires, of professional identity:
the actual performance and context of laboring. In this sense, the public professions of teacher and judge are strikingly
similar. Both are charged with a duty to act as neutral, objective figures in order to normalize and examine individual
subjects for the public good. In each profession, contemporary tensions between competing desires are located at the site
of examination. Indeed, a trial is defined by the most widely used legal dictionary as "[a] formal judicial examination of
evidence" (Garner, 2004). And, as we will explain more thoroughly, the colonization of capitalist concepts follows similar
veins of thought through both professions. A review of how similarly situated professions have been able to take
advantage (or not) of these lines of flight provides not only an interesting comparison, but hopefully a generative space for
the development of new and better ways of teaching and judging. We will theorize that judges have been able to find and
pursue, in small but meaningful ways, a line of flight. We wish to examine the professions of judge and teacher in order to
think through the various histories and issues that have come into play which have allowed a line of flight for judges, but
not for teachers. So, what is a line of flight? What does it look like? What is the process of finding and traversing this line
of flight and into what realm or alterity?
We borrow from Deleuzian theory in order to explore the schizophrenic process inherent in capitalism, and the ways this
process potentializes cyclical repression or the possibility of a line of flight or escape. In this analysis, we take up the
Deleuzian concepts of immanent ethics and ethical breach. Deleuze's theories are helpful because they allow us to explore
the ethical breach as a concurrence of impediment and opportunity. Deleuze also allows us to theorize these two
professions, that of judge and teacher, without relying on power relations as the beginning/end game of all capitalist flows.
For Deleuze, desire is the key force and animator of all machines, bodies, representations, and flows. It “invades and
invests the productive forces and the relations of production. There is only desire and the social, and nothing else”
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 29; emphasis in the original). It is because of the democratic way in which desire infects,
produces and invades all discourses and all positionalities that we can effectively theorize the judge as a counterpoint to
the teacher. Before we begin, more should be said on the laboring bodies of judges and teachers; the landscape of labor,
and representational positioning within that landscape, of both judge and teacher.
Representations and Labor
As laboring bodies, judges and teachers are similar. First, let us focus on the actual space of practice for these professions.
Both judges and teachers labor in a technically public but functionally private space. On the one hand, there is a cultural
understanding and actual practice of a publiclyaccessible classroom and courtroom. Most schools, even private schools,
have a policy of opendoor classrooms. That is to say, teachers should be prepared for members of the public to view their
classrooms at just about any time. Identically, for the judge, court proceedings are nearly always open to the public.
However, in both judging and teaching, most of the actual labor goes on outside the public eye, for teachers,
administrators and parents rarely come to the classroom. The teacher closes the classroom door and does the business of
teaching in what is usually a fairly private (behind closed doors) space. The same can be said for the judge. Though the
courtroom is open to the public, the public is present only for extraordinary cases.
Second, public consciousness perceives significant power held by judges and teachers. In the cultural imaginary, through
experience and media, both teachers and judges are positioned as lawgivers, heads of their respective spaces. Public trust
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in the power of each profession imposes strict neutrality on both teachers and judges. For judges, this position of neutrality
has been recently popularized by Chief Justice John Roberts’ analogy of a judge to an umpire, which was echoed again
and again in Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings (Moore, 2009). Parents, and the public in general, are angered and
alarmed when they perceive that a judge or a teacher brings personal politics and values into a classroom/courtroom. This
imposed neutrality not only requires teachers and judges to censor certain views, beliefs, and values while teaching and
judging, but also spills over into their nonprofessional activities. Accordingly, teachers are singled out when they act or
express views that violate a perception of neutrality, such as attending a pride parade. The same applies to judges. In fact,
the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct specifically limits a judge's participation in certain
"educational, religious, charitable, fraternal organizations," and even for permitted activities cautions the judge to avoid
activities in these organizations that "that reflect adversely upon a judge's independence, integrity, and impartiality"
(American Bar Association, 2007).

The conditions of labor for judges and teachers, representations in popular culture, and the depth of surveillance over
teachers’ or judges’ views are likely a function of the similar public functions served by both judges and teachers. First and
foremost, judges and teachers socialize subjects such as students, litigants, and collective groups. The teacher is tasked
with preparing subjects to become effective, efficient, and docile workers. In the narrative of teaching, a productive laborer
is ellided to mean the same thing as a productive member of society. The teacher is expected to teach a culturallyaccepted
version of morality: honesty, work, accountability, competition, but also kindness. Judges are similarly expected to create
or rehabilitate subjects under cultural/political and marketdriven norms. Judges must exercise judicial discretion in
numerous contexts, and each exercise of discretion must match a culturallyaccepted version of justice: avoiding harm,
keeping promises, and balancing competing claims. Through discourses of rehabilitation and justice, judges are assigned
the task of reforming criminal perpetrators into jobholding members of society. Similarly, judges are tasked with
constituting, recognizing, and defining certain types of collective subjects, e.g., corporations, governments, agencies, and
trusts, and also play a role in rehabilitating dysfunctional collective subjects and sometimes even industries, such as big
tobacco. For both judges and teachers, molding the subject is of primary importance.
However, neither the teacher not the judge may stop at simply molding a subject: They must each measure, report, and
mark individual subjects through a process of examination. At the end of a course, a teacher must judge the skills and
performance of each student. The teacher’s decision marks the student and provides signals to larger social and economic
structures, such as parents and employers, with respect to the subject. Similarly, through the process of trial, defined in
legal dictionaries as an examination, a judge marks each subject that appears before him or her, and this decision marks the
litigant providing signals to the same larger social structures. For both the teacher and the judge, the point of
examination/trial has become a significant exception to our assertion that judges and teachers perform their labor in
functionally private spaces. Technology has made the results of examinations and trials readily, even instantly, accessible,
and contemporary political economy has reimagined these results, to differing degrees, as the measure of professional
success. In the cases of both teachers and judges, use of these measures has been colonized by capitalist discourses, modes,
which have in turn deeply affected each profession.
Many theorists have explored the ways that the market has directed and infiltrated education, in educational issues such as
curriculum development, pedagogy, and juridical practice surrounding schooling. For example, Freire (1997) has
suggested that traditional education privileges the capitalist oppressor and is “designed to dissuade the [oppressed] people
from critical intervention in reality” (p. 34). Michael Apple (2000) has taken up this theme as well and has advocated the
idea that education has been integrated “into a wider set of ideological commitments. . . They include the dramatic
expansion of that eloquent fiction, the free market” (pp. 8485). Giroux (2009) also theorizes this issue and talks about the
lack of spaces where children can engage in knowledge creation without the surveillance and invasion of the market.
Similarly, the market has directed the judicial system, and judging itself. Many jurists, lawyers, and academics have
explicitly, and often proudly, described litigation and its concomitant judging in market terminology: “[A] lawsuit
represents a transaction and a legal system is a market(place) for such transactions . . . in a lawsuit, a plaintiff trades her
claim for money and the defendant trades its money for finality” (Rubenstein 2006). In this reimagination, a judge
becomes less a participant in the legal system and more a broker of legal services.
We will track the infiltration of capitalist discourse and economic models onto judging and teaching, its concomitant
tensions with the labor conditions and professional identity of teachers and judges, and the development of lines of escape
by judges. We choose to use a Deleuzian framework for our piece because Deleuze's accounting of the schizophrenic
process, explored most clearly in Deleuze and Guattari's works AntiOedipis (1983) and A Thousand Plateuas (1987),
allows us to focus on why and how systems and representations can change, even while functioning within a context of
capitalism. Deleuze's theories allow us to focus on labor, the practice and context of labor. It allows us to focus on desire
and the ways that desire infiltrates and fuels bodies and structures. With Deleuze, we can compare different knowledge
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol5/iss2/8
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groups or performance structures based upon their desiring connections to each other, rather than their place on some sort
of hierarchical grid of power and prestige.

This makes Deleuze an ideal choice when comparing the teacher to a judge. We realize that teachers and judges are
hierarchically separated by power and prestige. However, as we have explained, both professions are invested with very
similar desiring drives. For Deleuze, this provides room for even the most blasphemous comparisons: “From the point of
view of libidinal investment, it is clear that there are few differences between a reformist, a fascist, and sometimes even
certain revolutionaries.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 364). So why not compare the circulation of desire from the
professions of teacher and judge? The ability to compare these two professions allows for some interesting insights into
the schizophrenic process, and a great chance to reflect on how structures and practices actually change in a capitalist
system.
The Schizophrenic Process
In order to understand the schizophrenic process, it is important to understand the way that Deleuze talks about desire and
the capitalist system. For Deleuze, desire is the underlying power that propels socially produced modes of
being,productions that enunciate both subjects and the larger society. It is libidinous, to use Freudian terminology: Desire
is the libidinous movement or flow of production and consumption (Deleuze, 1990, ). Desire, when modulated by the
market, is the force for social production. As Smith (2007) puts it, “your very drives and impulses, even the unconscious
ones, which seem to be what is most individual about you, are themselves economic, they are already part of what Marx
called the infrastructure” (p. 6). To expand on this, Smith (2007) notes,
Your drives have been constructed, assembled, and arranged in such a manner that your desire is positively
invested in the system that allows you to have this particular interest. This is why Deleuze can say that desire as
such is always positive. Normally, we tend to think of desire in terms of lack: if we desire something, it is because
we lack it. But Deleuze reconfigures the concept of desire: what we desire, what we invest our desire in, is a social
formation, and in this sense desire is always positive. Lack appears only at the level of interest, because the social
formation—the infrastructure—in which we have already invested our desire has in turn produced that lack. (p.9)
So, for Deleuze, desire is always a productive force and it enunciates all social formations. The socius, that is, the
collective social body, enacts the channeling of desire, which circulates through all, into frequencies or roads that benefit
the capitalist system, that benefit the market. Desire is harnessed and modulated through state regulation into
productivities for the market.
Perhaps an imperfect analogy will be of assistance as we come to terms with Deleuze's concept of desire and the market.
Imagine a system of waterworks. Desire, in the Deleuzian sense, is the water: Its only aim is flow, to continue to move. It is
constant momentum, constant motion, and the capitalist system is the channeling of the water. In a waterworks system, the
water is channeled to go into different tunnels or in different directions, toward different ends. The capitalist system
channels desire just like a waterworks system channels water.
So, can desire ever escape this modulation, channeling, or repression in service of the market? According to Deleuze and
Guattari (1983), the schizophrenic process, inherent to capitalism, provides a potential of escape: “the schizophrenic
escape converts into a revolutionary investment” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 341).
The schizophrenic process is inherent in capitalism because both capitalism and schizophrenia are perpetuated through the
process of deterritorialization. Capitalism works, is flexible and exerts power, “insofar as it brings about the decoding of
flows that the other social formations coded and overcoded” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p. 246). This decoding results in
what Attias (1998) refers to as the “generalized interchangeability” of anything (p. 100). Attias continues his analysis of
the decoding and deterritorializing process by suggesting that,
[w]hile the precapitalist state machines tended to overcode the fluxes of desire with regulations, capitalism does the
exact opposite, decoding and deterritorializing the fluxes by means of money. . . There may be a world of
difference, for example, between three tons of lard and a Kalashnikov AK47, but the logic of capital flattens out
this difference through the mediatory abstraction of money. The rifle has the equivalent value on the market of
three tons of lard. (p. 100)
According to Attias, this decoding process reaches more than just artifacts in the marketplace. Capitalism is “continually
overturning and decoding various rituals, ways of life, and social organizations (p. 100). Thus, all information and desire
Published by Western CEDAR, 2010
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becomes freefloating and divorced from any concrete, or required, meaning or implication. However, according to
Deleuze and Guattari (1983), “flows are decoded and axiomatized by capitalism at the same time” (p. 246). That is to say,
while information and desire remain unattached to concrete meaning, desire and information are modulated by the market
and come to represent meaning in the service of the market. This modulation, however, is not a perfect process.

This is where Deleuze's concept of the breach of ethics comes into play. For Deleuze, there is a very careful distinction
between ethics and morality. “He uses the term 'morality' to define, in very general terms, any set of 'constraining' rules,
such as a moral code . . . (this is good, that is evil)” (Smith, 1998, p. 252). Ethics, on the other hand, are “a set of
'facilitative' (facultative) rules that evaluates what we do, say, and think according to the immanent mode of existence that
it implies” (Smith, 2007, p. 1). Ethics, for Deleuze, will evaluate the potential for something to act—to be empowered
toward a desired end. Immanent ethics, which is Delueze's term (1994) for ethics as a way of distancing himself from a
transcendent notion of ethics, uses a criterion of action and ability. Deleuze suggests that immanent ethics evaluates a
mode of existence or trajectory of desire “according to their tenor in 'possibilities'” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 171). Ethics, then, is
about removing internal constraints bounding desire from action. According to Daniel Smith (2007), “what an ethics of
immanence will criticize, then, is anything that separates a mode of existence from its power of acting” (p. 3). So, to go
back to our analogy, while the Capitalist marketplace attempts to channel the water/desire in one direction or another, this
is an imperfect process. There are moments in a waterworks where the water channel is suddenly dammed or gapped. If a
new channel isn't opened within the waterworks system, eventually the water will explode or erupt out of the current
waterworks system. The water will escape, onto the floor, into the sky, anywhere outside of the system. This explosion out
of bounds marks the potential for newness or difference. The initial moment of the gap or the dam is what Deleuze would
call an ethical breach.
An ethical breach occurs when the force of desire, which propels modes of existence, is not allowed the potential to act or
fulfill or flow, as in the damming of the water. When desire is disconnected from its trajectory toward fulfillment, a breach
or schiz is opened within the plain of capitalism. As Deleuze points out, desire, circulating in discourse, “is always and
already complete as it proceeds, and as long as it proceeds” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 382). However, when anything
“separates” desire “from its power of acting,” when anything separates desire from “the limit of what it can do” (Smith,
1998, p. 262263), a schiz is opened. The potentiality of desire has been breached, gapped, schizzed. While, on the one
hand, a breach of ethics can be seen as a negative thing, even in a Deleuzian sense—after all, desire has been gapped—on
the other hand, a breach of immanent ethics also entails a schiz, which is the point of potential and a moment where the
new may exist. The gap or schiz opened up provides a moment of possibility. It is important to point out that the capitalist
axiomatic is never saturated, and capitalist axioms will attempt to reterritorialize these gaps, orstopgaps.Yet, in that
moment of the schiz, desire is released and a proliferation of the new is possible, a line of flight or escape (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1983).
This is why capitalist systems attempt to control and command desire through a process of expanding axiomatics.
According to Deleuze, capitalism naturally includes “relative breaks”breaches or schizes within the socius as desire is
separated from potentiality (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 246). However, capitalism deploys new axioms in a process of
expanding axiomatic, i. e., new expressions, languages, modes of being, dictates, understandings, in order to fill or cover
those breaches. As Deleuze says, “for capitalism it is a question of binding the schizophrenic charges and energies into a
world axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary potential” (p. 246). The axiomatic always attempts to cover the
schiz or the breach and redirects desire “in the service of the capitalist order” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p. 246). In our
analogy, this would be the constant, dynamic redirection of the water away from a schiz/dam and into other everchanging
channels still determined by the system. Capitalist systems are in constant movement to deploy new axiomatics to control
and harness explosions of desire so as to uphold dominant modes of being and defer the revolutionary potential of desire
unleashed, or shizzed). Using our analogy, the system wants to avoid an eruption or explosion. So long as the new
channels are created fast enough, an explosion is diverted. The water stays within the system. However, if the new channels
and new diversions aren't created quickly enough, an explosion will occur. If the capitalist system is able to adapt, desire
will be diverted away from the schiz; desire will be channeled, once again, along capitalist lines. If, however, the capitalist
system of expanding axiomaticscreating new channelsdoesn't happen successfully, desire will explode, erupt out of the
system. Quite literally, a line of flight will be created.
So, to sum up, the schizophrenic process involves a cycle of deterritorializing codes and then repressing or re
territorializing those decodes and desire in the service of the market. As desire, flowing through discourses in servitude,
becomes gapped or breached, a schiz is opened. This schiz is a moment of potential. There is the potential that the schiz
will be stopgapped through an expanding process of axiomatics which reterritorializes discourse and remodulates desire.
There is also the potential that the schiz results in a line of flight, a line of escape. For Deleuze, the line of escape is
understood as a multiplication of desire, an explosion of desire. To use our analogy,think about the water exploding in all
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol5/iss2/8
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different directions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 348). The schizophrenic process is a story of desire: desire enslaved or
desire becoming “functional multiplicities” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 348). This process should become more clear as
we explore it via a theorization of the profession of the teacher and the judge.

The Schizophrenic Process and the Profession of Teacher
Deleuze's concepts of deterritorialization, breach or schiz, and reterritorialization, and expanding axiomatics of
reterritorialization are easy to observe in the life of a teacher. Let us first explore Deleuze's concept of deterritorialization.
Deterritorialization can be seen in the life of a teacher in the many ways that the identity of teacher is not tied to anything
concrete, but is decoded to mean a multiplicity of things within the socius. After all, what really is a teacher? What does a
teacher do? What does it mean to be in education? At times, teachers are deployed as the protector of human rights and the
mentors of emancipation. Joel Spring (2000) links education, and by association, the teaching profession, with the
protection of human rights. He states, “a universal right to an education is justified by being necessary for achieving other
human rights” (p. 75). He very explicitly links education as being required “if human rights are to be protected” (p. 74).
This kind of language is continued through out the works of many educational reformers, particularly those advocating a
praxis for social justice. Ira Shor (1992) links education and the teaching profession to being fundamental for “active
citizens” within a democracy (p. 11). Shor (1992) sees education as invested in modeling good democratic practice as
teachers employ a “participatory” and “interactive pedagogy” (p.17). In fact, Shor (1999) links democracy and education
by declaring that “the fate of democracy in school and society will be decided by the funding and curriculum wars now
under way”(p.viii). Through out the education literature, these connections are made. Freire (1989) connects education to
social justice and democracy by calling for “education as the practice of freedom” (p.69). David Bloome (1997) believes
that students must be educated to live democracy: “[A]s teachers and educators, we are providing the resources and
creating the conditions in which all students can live it” (p. 244).
This deployment of teacher as liberator is further imagined in media texts. Movies like To Sir With Love (1967), Stand and
Deliver (1988), Dead Poets Society (1989), , Dangerous Minds (1995), School of Rock (2003), The History Boys (2006),
and many others position the teacher as an emancipator and differencemaker. These movies position teachers as able to
help their students transcend their societies. The teacher is seen as a powerful force for change in the lives of these
students. Interestingly, at least in some of the media/texts, this change often occurs because the teacher is willing to use an
emancipatory pedagogy and a changeoriented curriculum. These types of pedagogy and curriculum are often positioned
as against the oppressive, or dominant, norms of society and the school. This kind of media deployment organizes a desire
within teachers to be the good kind of teachers—the kind that are involved in emancipatory projects.
Teachers and the identity of teacher are also deployed as the opposite of this narrative. In every story, movie, didactic text,
there is also the foil: the teacher who is not invested in emancipation. This is the image of the teacher, often deployed by
didactic texts, who is more invested in the canon and the status quo rather than emancipation. The foil to teacher as
emancipator is often embodied by teacher as lazy, teacher as arrogant and unconcerned, teacher as oppressive, teacher as
boring, and even teacher as abusive. These images are portrayed in movies like: The Browning Version (1951,) The Prime
of Miss Jean Brodie (1969), Ferris Beuller's Day Off (1986), One Eight Severn (1997), and of course Blue Car (2003). As
long as the idea of a teacher cannot be concretely coded onto any one representation, or deterritorialization, the notion of
teacher becomes freefloating—a competitive and conflative amalgamation of identity representations.
From here, it is important to note the ways that axiomatization and reterrititorialization work within the profession of
teaching. Axiomatization is the process whereby representations, and desire circulating in representation, are
reterritorialized in the service of the market. This is illustrated by the ways that, while teacher identity is still not fully
fixed, professional identity becomes linked into a metanarrative whereby teaching and education become deployed as in
servitude to the needs of the market. As Tyack and Cuban (1995) see it, “schools are a public institution oriented to
equality in a society dominated by private institutions oriented to the market” (p.29). As the market has continued the
process of reterritotialization, the field of education has been on a continual journey toward a “vision of scientific
management” (Tyack & Cuban, 1995, p. 8). This has often translated into businesslike or factorylike visions of
schooling. Tyack and Cuban name multiple superintendents and government policymakers throughout the past century
who
spoke of schools as 'factories in which the raw materials (children) are to be shaped and fashioned into products to
meet the various demands of life.' Aware of criticisms that schools wasted the public's taxes, city school chiefs
avidly calculated the cost effectiveness of everything from a lesson in Latin to the purchase of school desks. They
Published by Western CEDAR, 2010
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detailed educational 'objectives' and blueprints for instruction. Like efficiency experts in industry . . . they thought
it possible for managers to plan tasks while workers (teachers, students) did the work. (p. 114115)

As reterritorialization of teacher identity and the idea of what counts as a good education has continued in attenuation to
the market, “education has, in most instances, been reshaped to become the arm of national economic policy, defined both
as the problem (in failing to provide a multiskilled flexible workforce) and the solution (by upgrading skills and creating
a source of national export earnings" (Blackmore, 2000, 134).
Kliebard (2004) gives an example of reterritorialization of education in the service of the market by pointing to the ways
that teacher certification and standardized tests have become part of the metanarrative of efficiency and accountability in
education as a way to serve the market. “The entry of the federal government” on “such a massive scale changed the
dynamics” of how the role of education was seen visavis the larger society and the economy (Kliebard, 2004, p. 269).
This change of dynamics—and rechanneling of desire—has resulted in increased teaching certification criteria and
increased pressure on teachers to somehow force their students to do well on highstakes tests.
The criteria for teacher certification have been reworked multiple times throughout the past century. Edelfelt and Rafts
(1998) issued a report published by the Association of Teacher Educators that reviewed all of the changes that have been
implemented in teacher certification procedures over the past 130 years. They found that, while many of the problems and
supposed solutions have remained the same throughout the time frame, this has resulted in significantly more tests,
knowledge, and skills requirements for teachers in order to be certified. As government systems channel education into the
service of the economy, more and greater accountability measures are put into place that support positioning teachers as
cogs in an economic machine. More tests and examinations have been put into place to try and discover if teachers possess
the skills and knowledge bases deemed necessary in order to produce more efficient workers for the economic system.
Praxis I, Praxis II, and Praxis III, as well as increased portfolio requirements have made getting teacher certification a
process of assessment after assessment.
Richard Arends (2006) also gives some excellent examples in the movement and changes in teacher certification practices.
He makes an example of two women, one getting her certification in 2005, the other in 1960:
Even a cursory view of these two scenarios illustrates that, although some things remained the same over the 45
year period between 1960 and 2005, some rather dramatic changes had occurred in the design and execution of
teacher education and in the performance assessment of teacher candidates. . . [There was an] evolution toward
more accountability and the use of performance assessments to ensure accountability and professionalism. (p. 4).
The yen for increased efficiency and accountability to ensure efficiency now, more than ever before, also gets incorporated
into the lives and identity constructions of teachers after they've become certified and enter the classroom. The increased
focus on highstakes testing for students has become a method for weeding out the bad, or lessefficient teachers in order to
preserve the good or more efficient teachers. This is where the process and symbolic ordering of the "examination" has
been fully colonized by Capitalism and has actually come to define what it means to be a teacher:
The myth of standardized testing is that it raises the quality of education to its highest levels and does so in ways
that are measurable and generalizable. Within this view, the failure of schools is a failure of management due to an
inability of their “lowest level” employees (i.e., the teachers) to induce achievement in their students. The remedy
derived from this view of schooling is to create a management system that will change behavior through more
accountability. (McNeil and Valenzuela, 2000, p. 3)
This myth is supported by the production of numbers, the statistics that are generated from the highstakes tests. As Dorn
(1998) has noted, “statistical accountability systems are important because numbers have visible power in public debate. . .
A number connotes objectivity or, at the very least, legitimacy” (p. 1). As numbers are published showing declining test
scores, it becomes easy to position the school as a failing enterprise and the teachers of the school as failed employees.
Thus, teachers become subject to ideologies and policies that require the job stability of teachers to be linked with the
performance of their students on standardized tests. This creates a situation where teachers, in order to be seen as good and
efficient employees, are made accountable for their students' scores.
Teachers are produced and recognized as teachers insofar as they labor in accordance with the policies and cultural
imaginary aligned with the market. The examination takes center stage. Public policy and the media operate as arms of the
market to draw focus to the examination as the very public symbol of teacher worth. Schooling has come to be in service of
the market: Students should do well in school so they can find jobs and we can support American capitalism in a global
world. The examination has become the public marker of how well teachers are socializing students to fit within that goal.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol5/iss2/8
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As such, the very ways, manners, possibilities, and options of laboring as teachers come to be molded and shaped by the
market drive. How teachers teach, and whether they are recognized as teachers at all, good or bad, depends upon how
closely they are aligned with the ideologies produced in service to the market

Reterritorialization deploys a metanarrative of teaching and education whereby the freefloating forms of teacher as
liberator or teacher as foiltotheliberator are then brought together as a cautionary tale. If you support the market, then
your students will be emancipated and you can see yourself as the liberator. If, however, the market finds you to be
inefficient, then you, as a teacher, become the foil.
This move is illustrated in language used throughout the No Child Left Behind (NCLB, 2005) legislation. The language at
the beginning of the bill acknowledges deep rifts in class and socioeconomic status. The bill acknowledges that it is not
socially just to perpetuate inequality. As one reads NCLB and information put out by the government about NCLB, one
finds a whole section dedicated to selling the bill to some minorities. There are sections called “How No Child Left Behind
Benefits African Americans, and “How No Child Left Behind Benefits Hispanics,” among others. In the section
introducing the bill to African Americans, we read, “because of No Child Left Behind, closing the achievement gap is now
a national priority. Schools are now held specifically accountable for the annual progress of African American students.
Schools must have high expectations for every child  the soft bigotry of low expectations is no longer tolerated”
(emphasis in the original; NCLB, 2005). So, the representation of education and teaching as emancipation gets deployed
as part of a bill that will only encourage the training of the students into “subjectivized variable capital” (Deleuze and
Guattari, 1983, p. 70). (For more on the ways that NCLB funnels human capital into the market, see Street, 2005;
Eferakorho, 2006; Giroux & Schmidt, 2004; and Pepper, 2007, to name just a few.)
This move from deterritorialization to reterritorialization in the service of the market happens over and over unless there is
an apparent breach in the trajectory of desire. As noted before, this breach opens when desire is interrupted and not allowed
to proceed toward fulfillment. This happens when the desire invested in the deterritorialized codes is seen to be disrupted
by the narratives of reterritorialization. For teachers, this can happen when the desire associated with the idea of teacher as
liberator is seen to be disrupted, rather than remodulated, through reterritorialization. For example, Margot Pepper (2006),
an educator and writer, illustrates this moment of disjuncture very well in her piece No Corporation Left Behind: How a
Century of Illegitimate Testing Has Been Used to Justify Internal Colonialism.
Pepper is both a writer invested in the representation of emancipatory education, and a secondgrade teacher required to
give her students the tests associated with NCLB. Pepper (2006) believes that testing and other accountability measures
run directly contrary to desire invested in projects of social justice. Pepper (2006) states,
Little known by the taxpayers footing the bill is the fact that for over a century, such normreferenced test results
have been misinterpreted in the United States to support a myriad of immoral campaigns from slavery to the
abolition of Head Start. Some scholars have identified this historic pattern as a product of internal colonialism to
amass capital at the expense of an expendable minority. Like the inappropriate use of the Intelligence Quotient or
IQ tests, NCLB standardized tests are being used to lend legitimacy to policies which lead to cheap labor and large
profits in the private sector. (p. 1).
Pepper has come to a point where she recognizes the desire circulating in representations of the teacher and education as
emancipators, are being breached or schizzed. The attempt to remodulate the desire invested in the emancipatory mythos
into alignment with the mythos of efficiency and freemarket policy, has cut across and opened a schiz in the desire
circulating through this discourse/representation. A breach of ethics, a breach in the circulation of desire along this
particular trajectory, has occurred. This kind of experience is mirrored by many other educators across this country. Many
theorists are drawing attention to the ways that discourses of emancipation are interrupted by discourses of marketization.
Appadurai (1996) frames education as transformation,and education in service of the market, as being antithetical. He says,
“[w]hat is required is a sustained effort to create a climate that is actually hospitable to . . . the new or the transformation of
what already exists by the new” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 26). Appadurai, thus, uses language meant to draw attention to or
prolong the schiz. More and more, educators are coming to see the rift between the desiring discourse that positions them
as educators for emancipation and the desiring discourse that positions them as educators in the service of the market. Still,
for the profession of teacher, this schiz has thus far always resulted in further axiomatization.
The axiomatizing cycle always opposes revolutionary potential, or escape (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 246). While the
schiz naturally occurs as part of capitalist structure, these schizzes can either result in a line of flight or a remodulation, an
axiomatization, by the market. The difference depends “on whether the decodings are caught up in the axiomatic or not; . .
. on whether controlling reterritorializations are added to the process of deterritorialization” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p.
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247). Thus far, in the teaching profession, the breaches of desire circulating in representations of teacher as emancipator
have resulted in further control devices of testing and surveillance which have been deployed as part of a larger narrative
supporting these strictures in support of the market, the expanding axiomatics. As the market and government combine to
deploy more control over what can be taught and over who can teach, the schiz is stopgapped so as to reorient the focus
onto education in service of the market. As testing becomes more public, the project of schooling gets told as a story of
education in order to have economic stability or dominance. Figure One shows an illustration of this process. In this figure,
desire gets modulated toward axiomatization on behalf of the market rather than as a potential escape. By contrast, the
schizophrenic process has resulted in an appreciable line of escape and multiplicity of desire and meaning for the
profession of judges. The profession of judging has been able to take advantage of the schiz and develop a line of flight
into multiplicity: a multiplicity of what it means to labor as a judge.

Figure 1

The Schizophrenic Process and the Profession of Judge
The profession of judge has a long history. It is a profession that has often been the site of revolution and
counterrevolution, of encoding and decoding, of territorialization and reterritorialization. The profession has recently
experienced a schiz that has developed into a line of flight, into a proliferation of desire and representations of judging as
such. This proliferation of desire is itself revolutionary; although it remains to be seen when/whether the capitalist
axiomatic will be able to cauterize and unitize the schiz or not (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983,). What is certain, however, is
that at this moment, the profession of judging has been carried away by a proliferation of judges, of modes of judging, and
the development of new relationships to law. This is a development that should be encouraged for its own sake, for the
possibilities, despite the dangers, of the new. To see how it came to this, let us examine the schizophrenic process within
the profession of judging.
Prior to the ninteenth century, concepts of judging developed through an accepted understanding of a commonlaw
system. Common law judging was deeply invested in a sense of natural law common to all men which predated, and in
fact superseded, the sovereignty of the aristocracy claimed through the Norman Conquest (Foucault, 1997, p. 106). This
appeal to the concept of the law as natural and common created an ideology of the law and judging as antihierarchical
and impartial (Abraham, 1998, pp. 12). In fact, the rituals of the courtroom go a long way to maintaining the ideology of
the judge as the impartial giver of the natural law. In trialthe point of examinationthe courtroom maintains strict
differentiation among jurors, lawyers, and the public. The judge is singularly separated and elevated; the special
relationship is intended to create the impression of “supremacy, impartiality, and abstraction” (Almog, 2006 p. 20405). In
literature and film, with the notable exception of William Gaddis’s novel, A Frolic of His Own (1994), the judge is less a
character than a caricature: justice personified. The judge is merely a passive part of the legal setting (Posner, 1998). In this
discourse, the judge is an evenhanded, depersonalized lawgiver. And the judge gives the law by making a formal,
judicial examination at trial (Garner, 2004).
These codes of impartiality and the service to a preexisting natural law also, in time, developed not only highly ritualized
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol5/iss2/8
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symbols of judicial impartiality, but also highly ritualized courtroom and trial procedures. To enforce commonlaw rights,
a litigant had to plead with the judge for the court's decision. Far from being a descriptive verb, pleadings were ritual
statements which had to be completed correctly for a litigant to prevail at trial. Over time, the formal nature of pleadings
multiplied into numerous, but highly stylized, rigid, and timeconsuming rituals, rituals that not only informed but also
often directed, limited, or governed results at trial, the site of examination. Each type of case (e.g., trespass, breach of
contract, theft) had a special type of ritualized pleading that was unique to it. Judges and lawyers followed complex and
detailed pleading rules which were many and varied. Instead of a single type of trial, there were many types of trials,
depending on the required form of pleading. As the influential William Blackstone (1768) wrote in his Comentaries on the
Laws of England, which were extensively used and incorporated in early American law: "Trial then is the examination of
the matter of fact in issue; of which there are many different species, according to the difference of the subject, or thing to
be tried." (p. 330). In this regime, common law judges operated within the strictures of this formality which were , like
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce of Dickens’ Bleak House (1853), incomprehensible to those without legal training. Under this
discourse, the concept of a good judge was defined as one who was good at discharging the law in all of its ritualized
process, with emphasis on identifying the proper type of pleading, and thus, supervising the proper type of
examination/trial. Thus, the judge was the embodiment of the natural, but above all, impartial rituals of the law.

In the nineteenth century, things changed. Capitalist discourses dismantled and deterritorialized the codes of common law
pleading in order to recreate judges and processes of judging which were better able to serve the developing industrial
markets. Legal historian Lawrence Friedman describes the process of increased pressures, caseloads, and economic
responsibilities brought to bear on judges and courts beginning in the nineteenth century: “The American legal system
faced demands from industry and commerce and from an enormous middle class of consumers of law” (Friedman, 1985, p.
388). In the face of ballooning court dockets, some judges applied “radical routinization” and “assemblyline justice” (p.
390). This assemblyline concept was more broadly applied in 1848 when New York State passed the highly influential
Field Code. (Friedman, 1985, p. 391). The Field Code was highly simplified, unstylized, and “was meant to destroy the
[ritualized] paraphernalia” of common law pleading and deploy a single type of pleading and a single type of trial under
universally applicable standards (Friedman, 1985, p. 392). Friedman explains the change in terms of economics: “Just as a
mass market led to mass production of commodities, so a mass market led to a mass production of law” (p. 398). The
capitalist system decoupled the coding of judges as the embodiment of justice, and, through a process of
reterritorialization, judges and the judicial process began to be represented by a drive toward efficiency and attenuation to
the market. Thus, policy shifted so that the profession was remodulated toward the marketplace.
The judicial process became reterritorialized in the economics of pleading. By the turn of the century, the numerous,
ritualized common law forms of action were replaced by “one form of pleading” that was not technical at all, but required
only “a short and plain statement” (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 2, 8, 2008; emphasis added). Although this is
technically not the Field Code, for ease of reference, we will use Field Code to refer to all modern pleading practices owing
their existence to this first codification. In this pleading regime, as demonstrated by the first rule of Civil Procedure, good
judges were policed into an efficiencyfirst stance as they were required to discharge the law in order “to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding” (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 1;
emphasis added).
These changes markedly affected the profession of judging. Contemporary descriptions of judging and contemporary
judicial ideology are far from the mystical, commonlaw law giver. Judging, as a profession, was reterritorialized into an
economics of labor (Rubenstein, 2006). Judge Richard Posner, sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, describes judges this way:
My analysis and the studies on which it builds find that judges are not moral or intellectual giants (alas), prophets,
oracles, mouthpieces, or calculating machines. They are alltoohuman workers, responding as other workers do to
the conditions of the labor market in which they work. (Posner, 1998, p. 7)
As participants in a labor market, separating good judges from bad judges has become a capitalist process of separating
good workers from bad workers.
While adoption of the Field Code may have served the capitalist needs of a nineteenth century and early twentieth century
industrial capitalism, the desire circulating within discourses of judging as justice and judgment personified, and even
judging as an enterprise of efficiency, has come to be seen as schizzed within the profession. The use of the Field Code,
which at one time acted as a reterritorialization in alignment with the market, has come to be seen as an impediment to
justice and efficiency—a breach of ethics, an interruption of desire. Such dissatisfaction has erupted into numerous ways of
judging that are incompatible with Field Code Justice, and ways of judging which displace the trialthe examinationas
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the primary site of judging. Within the profession, judges have been able to focus the act of laboring away from market
drives and instead, focus the act of labor in alignment with the narration of judging as justice. This has resulted in an
explosion of possibilities for the actual labor done by a judge.

This explosion is illustrated in a number of ways, two of which are sufficient for the purposes of this paper. First, is the
vanishing trial. Second, is the proliferation and development of specialized Courts where judges play new roles
incompatible with traditional judicial ethics, and incompatible with the traditional trial.
The vanishing trial is a phenomenon whereby the judging goes on outside of the courtroom as well as apart from and prior
to the point of examination. About five years ago, Marc Gallanter highlighted this phenomenon occurring in Federal
litigation: Judges were working on more cases than ever but there were fewer and fewer cases brought to trial (Gallanter,
2004). Since then, the topic has garnered an enormous amount of attention in the legal field, produced a fast growing body
of literature, and was even the subject of a special conference by the American Bar Association. Even critics who deny the
validity and efficacy of the vanishing trial phenomenon agree that judges are more active in traditionally nonjudicial
activitiesactivities which may go against codified judicial practices—by taking on the role of case managers.
Furthermore, nontrial activities like “alternative dispute resolution” (commonly referred to as ADR), has been gaining
increasing prominence for both litigants and judges (Lande, 2004, p. 202). In fact, most studies estimate that,depending on
the jurisdiction, only one half of one percent to ten percent of cases are resolved by trial (Shestowsky & Brett, 2008, p. 98).
Accordingly, a multiplicity of judging has been reintroduced, but unlike the multiplicity at common law, it occurs prior to
the point of examination, and indeed, the purpose of the multiplicity is to avoid the trial/examination all together.
Second, there has also been a proliferation of therapeutic courts since the 1990s. (Bozza, 2008 p. 113). These are
specialized courts which deal generally with criminal behavior in a collaborative, as opposed to adversarial, manner.
Because the model of adjudication is completely different, the role of the judge is completely different, and judges serving
therapeutic courts follow different rules: In fact, they are expressly exempt from the most recently promulgated code of
judicial ethics. (Harrison, 2007, p. 264). In one sense, the creation of therapeutic courts reintroduces multiplicities of the
type of trial; however, unlike the multiplicity of common law trials based on rituals to examine the evidence, the purpose
of therapeutic courts is explicitly to help mold the litigant and not to mark him or her through a traditional examination at
trial. Accordingly, the therapeutic judge is not an impartial objective law giver, but a helping participant. Adoption of
therapeutic judging is only possible once the commonlaw judge has been demystified, and the judge a laborer or worker,
sees an escape from the capitalist confines of traditional judging. The justification for these courts is heavily embedded in
the discourse of justice, which discloses a breach of justice by using the “assemblyline approach” that is the Field Code.
(Bozza, 2007, p. 101). The therapeutic courts movement is not without its critics, like Bozza, but it appears that
increasingly greater numbers of these Courts have strong support in federal legislation (Bozza, 2007). Policy has shifted
again, this time being modulated toward discourses of justice over market economy.
The legal profession has seen a proliferation in nontraditional adjudication. ADR itself is heavily invested in an outof
court, or nonFieldCode resolution, to legal disputes. In fact, in this discourse, the perceived impartial unity of the Field
Code itself has come under question. There is a growing body of literature questioning whether all trials should be
conducted under the same universally applicable standards (Hannon, 2008, p. 834), i.e. the profession no longer perceives
that there is a single set of examination questions to satisfy all issues as envisioned by the Field Code. Instead of
repressing and remodulating desire into a unity for the market, the recent explosion of modes of adjudication represents an
explosion of desire and the traversing of a line of escape from marketmodulated regimes of judging. Figure Two
illustrates this point. At one point, desire was modulated toward axiomatization by the market. However, current policies
allow for a proliferation and explosion of desire realized in variable codings of the judge.
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Figure 2
This movement, this explosion of adjudicatory modes, is not without its critics. There are critics which attempt to stop the
proliferation of courts with an axiom that links the impartiality of the judge and the discourses of justice and efficiency
with adjudication in a unified and more thoroughly pointed system of adjudication focused on the trial as the point of
examination, like the Field Code. This criticism is an attempt to reinstate the territorialization that led to the adoption of
the Field Code. However, despite their critics, it appears that these courts, and the ADR techniques forming the
explanatory basis of the vanishingtrial phenomenon are here to stay.
On its face, these changes may appear modest, but to a lawyer or judge, they are fundamental, indeed revolutionary. They
represent multiple avenues/lines of escape from the axioms of legal practice which are incompatible with the process
previously learned. Though we have been unable to locate any systematic studies, it is interesting to note that the most
recent multiplicity of judging, should have an effect on the conditions of labor for a judge. Both for the vanishing trial and
for therapeutic courts, less and less time is spent by the judge at trialthe most public point of examination. Accordingly, a
judge's relationship and visibility to the public have changed, and the conditions of labor may likewise change. For a legal
practitioner, the fundamental nature of this explosion and multiplicity is at once frightening and exciting. The very
existence of these lines of escape hold the promise, perhaps, of something better.

Multiplicity as Revolution and Opportunity
It may not at first seem that revolutionary: a multiplication in the ways that judges are judgesan explosion in the way that
judging is performed. However, this explosion of desire into a “multiplication of concurrent orders” of newness counts as a
chink in the armor of the market—of capitalism (Doel, 1993, p. 181). After all, Deleuze's project is Marxlike, thought not
necessarily Marxist. It is the repetition of multiplication, the infinite explosion of desire that will finally bring down
capitalist oppression of representation. As Deleuze suggests, and here he refers to desire unrepressed by capitalist axiom,
“despite what some revolutionaries think about this, desire is revolutionary in its essence—desire, not leftwing holidays!
—and no society can tolerate a position of real desire without its structures of exploitation, servitude, and hierarchy being
compromised” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 116). This is because, as Doel points out, difference in multiplicity
“deconstructs representation” (p. 179). It is representation, which “speaks only in the language of signs imposed on it by
merchant capital or the axiomatic of the market,” and is created from the residuum of codes deterritorialized by capitalism
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 241). According to Deleuze, as representations are deconstructed and multiplied, desirethe
desiringmachineis exploded from its repression (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 376). This is not to say that one causes the
other; rather, they happen at the same time. As the schiz releases desire, traversing a line of flight, multiplicities of desire
trajectories are released. This multiplicity of desire, desire flowing in new and different trajectories through thought and
meaning, “overthrows the established order” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 376). Thus, while a new multiplicity of
judging options may seem small, it is a meaningful explosion of desire. It is through numerous and repetitive explosions,
explosion through the axiomatic into the outside, which will bring an end to the repression of desire and the particular
subjugation of capitalism (Kaufman, 1998).
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While it is important to point out that, for Deleuzian theory, the explosion and multiplication of desire is in and of itself
revolutionary (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983), we, as authors, are left to consider what that multiplication, may bring. Is it
possible that a multiplication of desire along new trajectories brings with it modes of being that are even more oppressive
to the socius? According to Deleuze, the answer is yes. “Schizoanalysis as such does not raise the problem of the nature of
the socius to come out of the revolution” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 380). This is because desire only aims for desire
itself. Desire cares only for “what generative role desire enjoys therein [in the new regime or socius]” (Deleuze & Guattari,
1983, p. 380). So, there is risk in multiplication and the new. It is possible that, while the new ways of judging allow for the
“being multiple,” and offer “lines of variation, which do not even have constant coordinates,” that these new ways also
offer their own different kinds of oppression (Doel, 1993, p. 183). In the new, “anything could happen to anyone because
nothing yet has and no one is there. . . Nothing yet has taken place but the place” (Holland, 1991, p. 61). This is why Doel
points out that, just because there is difference and multiplicity and explosion of the new, it does not mean that there is
“no danger of confusion, ambiguity, impropriety or contamination” (p. 178). Still, we want to submit that this risk is worth
it, both because multiplicity can bring an end to the repressed desire inherent in the capitalist machine, and also because
the idea of a new place and a multiplication of possible trajectories fills us with excitement.

This excitement is true of an expansion, a multiplicity, even on a small scale. We admit that a multiplicity in judging has
not brought down the capitalist order. However, not only is it a chink in the armor of capitalism, but it has resulted in an
appreciable change in the ways that judges labor. Judges now have more options and more ways of being a judge. The
examination process, the trial, has been reworked to provide judges with more options, more lines of flight. Now, if the
examination process for teachers, and what it means to labor and be a teacher, could also be expanded and multiplied
decoded and exploded away from hinging on whatever the market wants—then teachers might also enjoy a greater
multiplicity. There is a potential for the new.
We, as authors, also want to question why it is that the schiz has been exploited within the profession of judging but not
within the profession of teaching. Does the profession of judging interpolate the socius and the idea of the public square in
such a way that the explosion of desire is easier, less subjected to axiomatization, than in the teaching profession? After
all, while teachers and judges are both government employees, and both subject to the market in their own ways, is there a
mysticism that surrounds the coupling of judge and justice within the very institution of the public that allows for a dodge
of axiomatizing discourses? Will further deterritorializations of teacher representations have to occur before the schiz can
be exploited (and desire exploded) by the teaching profession? These are important questions, and perhaps writing further
about teaching and desire can open avenues of thought where these questions are more fully explored and desire is
multiplied. And this is where we conclude our paper; hanging our hopes on the revolutionary possibility of writingthe
possibility that writing may prolong and explode the schiz.
Elizabeth St. Pierre compares writing, the process and act of writing, to the Deleuzian idea of deterritorializing thought and
inquiry“nomadic inquiry” (St. Pierre, 1999, p. 258). For her, escaping the axiomatics of the marketized social order
ordering of thought, ordering of connection is done by seeking a line of flight to the “aside” or “outside” through the act
of writing (St. Pierre, 1999, p. 278). She sees the aside as a pleasurable, although risky, place of doing and experimenting
(St. Pierre, 1999). She uses writing as a form of nomadic inquiry. It is writing, and seeking the outside within our writing
that allows us to participate in a nomadic journey—an inquiry into territories of the new. We want to echo this idea.
We want to echo De Certeau (1984) when he suggests that, the aside—the outsideis a space “to be other and to move
toward the other” (p. 110). We believe there is a pleasure in alterity and a subversiveness and release in multiplicity. While
we, as authors, believe that the new comes with risk, we also believe that this new and multiple space/place offers a chance
to experiment with different modes of being and dehiscent fields of inquiry. We believe that writing, for change and for
difference, is part of this risky journey of possibility. Writing allows for the possibility for exploiting the schiz and delving
into the new and multiple. We see this text as a brief attempt at writing the schiz, at pointing to the possibility of a new
space. And writing, of itself, is a space. “It is an affirmative, joyous space, perhaps the most thrilling of all the fields in
which we work” (St.Pierre, 1999, p. 266).
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